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The possibility of a great shallow earthquake (M 8) in the Tokai region, central Honshu, in the near future
was pointed out by Mogi in 1969 and by the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction (CCEP), Japan
(1970). In 1978, the government enacted the Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Law and began to set up
intensiﬁed observations in this region for short-term prediction of the expected Tokai earthquake. In this paper, two
serious issues are pointed out, which may contribute to catastrophic effects in connection with the Tokai earthquake:
1. The danger of black-and-white predictions: According to the scenario based on the Large-Scale Earthquake
Countermeasures Law, if abnormal crustal changes are observed, the Earthquake Assessment Committee (EAC)
will determine whether or not there is an imminent danger. The ﬁndings are reported to the Prime Minister who
decides whether to issue an ofﬁcial warning statement. Administrative policy clearly stipulates the measures to
be taken in response to such a warning, and because the law presupposes the ability to predict a large earthquake
accurately, there are drastic measures appropriate to the situation. The Tokai region is a densely populated region
with high social and economic activity, and it is traversed by several vital transportation arteries. When a warning
statement is issued, all transportation is to be halted. The Tokyo capital region would be cut off from the Nagoya
and Osaka regions, and there would be a great impact on all of Japan. I (the former chairman of EAC) maintained
that in view of the variety and complexity of precursory phenomena, it was inadvisable to attempt a black-and-white
judgment as the basis for a “warning statement”. I urged that the government adopt a “soft warning” system that
acknowledges the uncertainty factor and that countermeasures be designed with that uncertainty in mind. 2. The
danger of nuclear power plants in the focal region: Although the possibility of the occurrence of a great shallow
earthquake in the Tokai region was pointed out by CCEP in 1970, soon after, plans for construction of a nuclear
power plant started in this region. Since 1976, Hamaoka nuclear power plants (Units 1∼4) have been operating
near the center of the expected focal region of the great Tokai earthquake, and Unit 5 is under construction. This is
quite a dangerous situation.
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1. Origin and Progress of the “Tokai Earthquake”
Problem
The Tokai region, in central Honshu, Japan is the sole
target of the Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Act.
The possibility of the future occurrence of a great shallow
earthquake in the Tokai region was pointed out by Mogi
(1970, oral presentation, 1969; also see Utsu, 1999) based on
the horizontal crustal deformation (Harada and Isawa, 1969)
and seismic gap hypothesis. Chronology of the early stages
of development of the expected Tokai earthquake problem
is summarized in Table 1. In 1970, the Tokai region was
designated as an Area of Speciﬁc Observation for a M8
earthquake by the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake
Prediction (CCEP). In 1974, the region was upgraded to an
Area of Intensiﬁed Observation. In 1976, Ishibashi (1976)
proposed a model consisting of a large thrust event along
the Suruga trough. In 1978, the government enacted the
Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Law and began
implementing measures to prepare for the earthquake. Also
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in 1978, CCEP reexamined the designation of the Area of
Intensiﬁed Observation and Area of Speciﬁc Observation.
The designation of special regions in 1970 and 1978 is shown
in Fig. 1. In what follows, some of these topics are explained
in more detail.
Figure 2 shows the horizontal displacement vectors of
the triangulation points of the Japanese Islands (except for
Hokkaido) for 60 years (from 1883 to 1909 and from 1948
to 1967), as reported by Harada and Isawa (1969) on the
basis of data from the Geographical Survey Institute (GSI).
Mogi (1970) interpreted these results from a plate tecton-
ics point of view, indicating how strain has accumulated in
the Japanese Islands. The displacement vectors of the trian-
gulation points are divided into components that are normal
and parallel to the Nankai Trough, which is the subduction
plate boundary. Looking at the normal components, some
regions have been compressed toward the inland direction,
and conversely, other regions have moved outward toward
the sea side. Regions that have moved outward toward the
sea are places where compressive strain has been released
through the rebound caused by great thrust-type earthquakes
along the trench. Regions that had marked displacements
toward the inland side are places where compressive strain
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Fig. 1. Areas of Intensiﬁed Observation and Areas of Speciﬁc Observation designated by the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction in 1970
(top ﬁgure) and the revised one in 1978 (bottom).
Table 1. Tokai earthquake problem.
1969 Horizontal crustal deformation in Japan (Harada and Isawa)
Possibility of “Tokai earthquake” (Mogi)
1970 Designation by the Coordinatig Committee for Earthquake Prediction (CCEP)
“Area of Speciﬁc Observation”
1974 “Area of Intensiﬁed Observation” (CCEP)
1976 Focal model (Ishibashi)
1978 “Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Law”
1979 “Areas Under Intensiﬁed Measures Against Earthquake Disasters”
Earthquake Assessment Committee
(Central Disaster Management Council)
has been accumulated and are viewed as potential sites for
a great earthquake. Figure 3 (top) shows the distribution of
the magnitude of the displacement components normal to the
trend of the Nankai Trough. The lower ﬁgure shows loca-
tions of focal regions of three great thrust-type earthquakes,
1923 Kanto earthquake (M 7.9), 1944 Tonankai earthquake
(M 7.9) and 1946 Nankai earthquake (M 8.0), which oc-
curred along the Nankai-Sagami Trough during the above-
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Fig. 2. Horizontal displacement vectors of the triangulation points of the Japanese islands (except for Hokkaido) for 60 years (from 1883 to 1909 and
from 1948 to 1967) obtained by multiple ﬁxed stations method by Harada and Isawa (1969). Solid double circles show ﬁxed station (A∼E).
mentioned 60 years. It is noted that no great earthquakes
occurred in the Tokai region, and this region remains as an
un-ruptured region (the last rupture of this region occurred
in 1854). Focusing on the horizontal crustal movements and
this seismic gap of the ﬁrst kind, Mogi (1970) pointed out
the possibility of a great earthquake occurring in the Tokai
region.
Harada and Isawa (1969) analyzed the triangulation data
under the assumption that ﬁve stations chosen in stable re-
gions considered to have no displacement. The ﬁve ﬁxed
stations are indicated by closed double circles in Fig. 2. In
order to verify the pattern of deformation, Kasahara and Sug-
imura (1964) calculated the distribution of horizontal strain
in the western Japan, since the strain analysis does not con-
tain any assumptions about ﬁxed stations. Figure 4 shows the
spatial distributions of compression or extension in the direc-
tion normal to the trend of the Nankai Trough (Mogi, 1970),
which was modiﬁed from the original ﬁgure by Kasahara
and Sugimura (1964). Solid circles show the observations in
which the direction of the maximum compression axes are
nearly normal to the trend of the Nankai Trough. The spa-
tial pattern of strain in the direction normal to the trend of
the Nankai Trough is quite similar in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, thus,
supporting the reliability of Fig. 3.
Recently the methods for measurements of horizontal dis-
placements of the earth’s surface have been improved drasti-
cally by application of the Global Positioning System (GPS).
Figure 5 shows horizontal displacements observed by GPS
during recent two years period (1998–1999) in and around
the Tokai region. It is noticeable that this horizontal dis-
placement pattern in and around the Tokai region is nearly
similar to that in Fig. 2.
In 2001, the Central Disaster Management Council re-
ported a modiﬁed source region of the expected Tokai earth-
quake and the expected Seismic Intensity associated with the
occurrence of the earthquake (Fig. 6). This source model was
estimated from various data including crustal deformations,
seismic activity, and submarine topography (Central Disaster
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Fig. 3. Distribution of the magnitude (Hn) of the horizontal displacement, components normal to the trend of the Nankai Trough (top). The bottom ﬁgure
shows locations of focal regions of three great thrust-type earthquakes, which occurred along the Nankai-Suruga Trough during the above-mentioned
60 years. The Tokai region is recognized as a seismic gap of the ﬁrst kind (modiﬁed Mogi, 1970).
Management Council, 2001).
2. Danger of Black-and-White Predictions
From 1991, I was appointed as the chairman of the Earth-
quake Assessment Committee for the expected Tokai earth-
quake. I maintained that in view of the variety and com-
plexity of precursory phenomena, it was inadvisable to at-
tempt a black-or-white judgment regarding the likelihood of
an imminent earthquake and to use such a judgment as the
basis for a “warning statement” created a situation equiva-
lent to martial law. In order for the public to act accord-
ingly to earthquake, they must be also informed about the
levels of uncertainty. I have urged that the government adopt
a “soft warning” system that acknowledges the uncertainty
factor and that countermeasures be designed with that uncer-
tainty in mind. Unfortunately, at that time there was no sign
of progress with regards to this problem, and in 1996 I re-
signed my post. More recently, it seems, people have begun
to recognize the seriousness of the problem, and the issue has
ﬁnally come under serious discussion in Japan.
2.1 High cost of false alarms
As mentioned before, in 1970, CCEP pointed out the like-
lihood of an M8 earthquake in the Tokai district. The region
was designated as an “Area of Speciﬁed Observation,” and in
1974 the designation was upgraded to an “Area of Intensiﬁed
Observation.” In 1976, a report by Ishibashi (1976) received
widespread coverage in the media, which gave rise to con-
siderable anxiety among the residents of the region, centered
on Shizuoka Prefecture.
The government enacted the Large-Scale Earthquake
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Fig. 4. Distribution of strain (compression or extension) in the direction normal to the trend of the Nankai Trough (Mogi, 1970). This graph was obtained
from the horizontal strain calculated by Kasahara and Sugimura (1964).
Countermeasure Law and began implementing measures to
prepare for the earthquake. The law was enacted on the
supposition that a major earthquake of the size of the ex-
pected Tokai earthquake can be predicted because unmistak-
able precursory phenomena will be observed over a relatively
wide area.
This scenario calls for data gathered at observation sta-
tions throughout the Tokai district to be relayed to the Japan
Meteorological Agency (JMA) by modern telemetry, where
they will be continuously monitored. If something out of the
ordinary is observed, the Earthquake Assessment Commit-
tee (EAC), a private advisory panel to the director general of
JMA, will be convened and make a determination regarding
the likelihood of a major earthquake. If the EAC determines
that there is an imminent danger, it will relay this information
to the director general of JMA. Assuming the director gen-
eral agrees with the recommendation, the ﬁndings will then
be reported to the Prime Minister, who will convene a cabi-
net meeting and decide whether to issue an ofﬁcial “warning
statement.”
Administrative policy also clearly stipulates measures to
be taken in response to such a warning. Because the law
presupposes the ability to predict a great earthquake with
accuracy, there are drastic measures appropriate to a situation
in which it is believed that an earthquake is almost certain to
strike at any moment.
The Tokai region is a densely populated region with high
social and economic activities. Located between Tokyo and
Osaka, it is traversed by several vital transportation arteries:
The Tokaido Shinkansen “bullet train” line, the Tokaido Ex-
pressway, and the Chuo Expressway.
When a warning statement is issued, all transportation
along the Shinkansen and expressways within the areas of
intensiﬁed disaster measures are to be halted. Banks, post of-
ﬁces, department stores, and supermarkets would also close.
Hospitals would suspend out-patient treatment, and all chil-
dren would be sent home from school. The response mea-
sures in the Tokai area when a warning statement is issued
are summarized in Table 2 with some simpliﬁcation. These
are measures comparable to those taken under martial law.
The capital region would be cut off from Nagoya and Os-
aka, the country’s central and western centers of population
and commerce, and the impact would be felt in all of Japan
(Fig. 7).
A warning may continue for several days, but it is unlikely
that the Japanese could function under such severe restric-
tions for more than a few days.
2.2 Need for intermediate warning levels
At a 1987 symposium on earthquake prediction research
jointly sponsored by the Science Council of Japan and the
Seismological Society of Japan, I pointed out the difﬁculty
of dealing with earthquake hazards solely on the basis of a
simple yes-or-no, black-or-white prediction, and called for
the adoption of intermediate “gray” warnings (Mogi, 1987).
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Fig. 5. Horizontal displacements observed by GPS (1998–1999) in and around the Tokai region (after Geographical Survey Institute, Japan, 2003).
Table 2. Measures to be taken in the Tokai Area, when a Warning Statement is issued.
Railways Stopping of cars. Prohibition of inﬂow from outside areas.
Road Trafﬁc Prohibition of inﬂow from outside areas.





Hospitals Stopping of operation for outpatients.
Schools Children send back home.
(Simpliﬁed Land Agency, 1987)
My reasons can be summarized as follows.
First, if we study past earthquakes, we ﬁnd very few in-
stances in which the earthquake was preceded by unmis-
takable precursors. Where precursory phenomena were ob-
served by instruments, they were most often not clear. To
make earthquake prediction useful, we need to focus on these
weak precursory changes.
Second, there has been no reliable recorded instance of
a Tokai earthquake which occurred in isolation in the area
bounded by Suruga Bay and Enshu-nada (Sea of Enshu), as
expected this time. When this region has ruptured in the past,
it has always been part of larger earthquakes that included a
greater area along the Nankai Trough. The great 1854 Tokai
earthquake occurred across the whole region from the Tokai
district to the Kii Peninsula south of Osaka along Nankai-
Suruga Trough. Accordingly, we have no experience on what
sort of precursory phenomena may precede a Tokai earth-
quake that ruptures only this smaller region. Data from lev-
eling surveys just before the 1944 Tonankai earthquake off
the southeast coast of the Kii Peninsula might have provided
useful hints (Mogi, 1985), but the focal region is different
from that of the expected Tokai earthquake and these level-
ing data were limited. The prediction of a Tokai earthquake
is thus a ﬁrst-time undertaking in an area for which we have
no prior data. Moreover, since a fairly large part of the ex-
pected focal region is located under the ocean, the monitor-
K. MOGI : TWO GRAVE ISSUES CONCERNING THE EXPECTED TOKAI EARTHQUAKE lvii
Fig. 6. A modiﬁed source region of the expected Tokai earthquake (red curve) and the expected Seismic Intensity associated with the occurrence of the
earthquake (Central Disaster Management Council, 2001).
Fig. 7. Areas for Intensiﬁed Earthquake Prevention Measures Concerning the Expected Tokai Earthquake, designated by Central Disaster Management
Council in 2002 (yellow region). The Tokaido Shinkansen “bullet train” line, the Tokaido Expressway, and the Chuo Expressway are also shown.
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Fig. 8. A variety and complexity of precursory phenomena are schematically shown. The left ﬁgures show the possible development of crustal deformation
or seismic activity for cases in which a large earthquake occurs. The right ﬁgure shows those for cases where no large earthquake occurs. For the middle
case, a clear judgment may be difﬁcult.
ing network is insufﬁcient to observe all pertinent precursory
phenomena.
According to our experience, a variety and complexity of
precursory phenomena are schematically shown in Fig. 8.
The ﬁgures on the left show the possible development of
crustal deformation or seismic activity for cases in which a
large earthquake occurs. The ﬁgure on the right shows those
for cases where no large earthquake occurs. For the middle
case on the left, a clear judgment may be difﬁcult.
Under such circumstances, an all-or-nothing prediction
and warning system makes no sense for a highly populated,
heavily traveled area like the Tokai district. In the event that
very pronounced anomalies were observed and interpreted
unequivocally by experts, particularly those in the EAC, as
precursors of the Tokai earthquake, an ofﬁcial warning state-
ment could be issued. But in cases where less clear-cut
anomalies occurred, that nonetheless concerned earthquake
experts, it would make sense to issue a mild warning.
The basic status adopted under the Earthquake Counter-
measures Law is to not disregard any anomaly that may
portend an earthquake. This being the case, ofﬁcials might
well feel compelled to issue a warning statement in instances
where they would be better advised to simply caution the
public. With a warning statement, however, the probability
of a false alarm would be high. On the other hand, given
the high social and economic cost of a false alarm, ofﬁcials
might hesitate to issue a warning until the signs were unmis-
takable. Such hesitation would increase the probability of the
earthquake occurrence without any kind of ofﬁcial warning.
To avoid both of these undesirable scenarios, it is neces-
sary to offer more warning options, not simply the all-or-
nothing choice currently provided. Even weather forecast-
ers report the probability of precipitation—be it 30%, 50%,
etc.—instead of simply predicting rain or no rain. Weather
forecasters have a great deal on which to base their predic-
tions, including cloud movements recorded by the Himawari
weather satellite and a wealth of day-to-day experience.
Nonetheless, we all know that predicting the weather is no
easy matter. Earthquakes, which are fracture phenomena at
regions within the earth, are much more obscure. Compared
to short-term earthquake prediction, there has been more suc-
cess in developing methods for probabilistic long-term earth-
quake forecasts. Using geological fault slip rates, historical
seismicity rates, and local crustal deformation rates, models
can be developed to predict average earthquake occurrences
in a region over a long time period (hundreds to thousands of
years). These occurrence rates can be translated into prob-
abilistic predictions of earthquake occurrence (e.g. Working
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Fig. 9. Distribution of nuclear power plants in the world operated in 2001.
Table 3. A proposal of a mild warning system. Present system: Black-and-white prediction. Mild warning system: Black-gray-and-white prediction.
Black Gray
Train Stop Going slowly
Road Trafﬁc Stop Going slowly
Bank Operation stop Normally
Hospital Stop (patients out) Normally
School Back home Normally
Social and Economic cost Very high Low
Group on California Earthquake Probabilities, 1995). Al-
though this methodology does not predict the occurrence
of any particular earthquake, it does show how probabilis-
tic analyses can provide useful information about damaging
earthquakes over a longer time period.
For short-term predictions, scientists are asked to deter-
mine the size, place, and time of an earthquake on the ba-
sis of subtle signals scarcely detectable on the surface of the
earth, before such fractures occur deep beneath the surface.
In view of the difﬁculty of the task and the high cost of a
false alarm, it makes no sense to force forecasters to choose
either 0% or 100% probability. This is why we need milder
warnings accompanied by less severe restrictions on social
and economic activity.
2.3 Beneﬁts of a mild warning
My own view is that the measures accompanying a cau-
tion or mild warning should involve slowing down rather
than halting trafﬁc on the Shinkansen and expressways also
leaving hospitals, banks, post ofﬁces, and department stores
open. The government should provide the people with the
information they need to reduce potential damage, but keep
disruption of their daily lives to a minimum. It is vital, how-
ever, that the measures to be taken by communities in re-
sponse to such a warning be decided in advance, under the
leadership of the government’s crisis managers, and that they
are executed smoothly and competently. If forecasters be-
lieve an earthquake may be imminent, a great deal of damage
can be prevented simply by regulating transportation and ad-
vising residents to prepare calmly, within the context of their
daily activities. For example, securing furniture and keeping
gas stoppers closed can signiﬁcantly reduce damage and ﬁres
if strong earthquake shaking occurs. Under these circum-
stances the cost of a false alarm will be minimal compared
with that incurred by a warning statement.
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Fig. 10. Distribution of large shallow earthquakes of magnitude (M) 7.0 or larger with focal depths less than 40 km in the world that occurred in the past
100 years.
During the two decades since the Earthquake Countermea-
sures Law was enacted, major changes have occurred in so-
ciety and in the science of seismology. It is curious that gov-
ernment policy for mitigating the hazards of the Tokai earth-
quake has been virtually exempt from debate simply because
it is the basis of the Earthquake Countermeasures Law. The
time has come for a thorough review of that policy, including
the problem areas I have pointed out.
My resignation as chair of EAC appears to have alerted
many people to the warning issue. Many say they had no
idea there were such serious defects in the government’s pol-
icy for dealing with the major Tokai earthquake. They won-
der why such an obvious proposal has not been readily em-
braced. On the other hand, others have criticized my stance,
maintaining that a scientist should speak only on scientiﬁc
matters and not meddle in administrative affairs. Still, it is
not appropriate for EAC to report its decision within a frame-
work unsuited to the reality of the situation and then leave
the rest to administrators with no specialized knowledge of
earthquakes. We have a responsibility to join with adminis-
trators in considering the impact of our predictions and warn-
ings.
2.4 Recent movement
In March 1996, since there was no move for reconsider-
ation in spite of such a critical situation, I resigned as the
chairman of EAC. I wanted to appeal this matter to the so-
ciety in a visible manner. As a result, many people came to
pay attention to this “mild warning issue” with the help of
wide coverage by the media.
However, relevant agencies such as JMA continued
in their current policies without any alternation of their
thoughts. For example, they said “Chairman Mogi recom-
mend that a soft warning system should be established, but
it is not possible. The administration should not make any
move unless we know the status of the situation in black or
white” (e.g. Asahi Newspaper, Sept. 1, 1994).
I continued to emphasize the importance of this issue in
my books and magazines (Mogi, 1996, 1998, 2001a, b). In
addition, as an editorial writer for a Shizuoka newspaper,
I have written 14 times about this issue from June 1995 to
March 2003.
On May 29, 2003, the Central Disaster Management
Council, a Japanese government body, came up with the
“General Principles Regarding Countermeasures for the
Tokai Earthquake,” announcing that they were going to re-
consider the countermeasures for Tokai earthquake. Accord-
ingly, revisions were started on “The Basic Plan for Earth-
quake and Disaster Prevention.” This Basic Plan will con-
solidate the countermeasures at the time of issuing a warn-
ing statement with more loosened regulations. These drastic
revisions are the ﬁrst changes to the plans in the last 25 years.
National newspapers reported this shift in policy. Accord-
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Table 4. Nuclear power generation in the world (2001, Dec. 31).
In operation Under construction
Country Output (MW) Number Output (MW) Number
1 U.S.A. 101,742 103
2 France 62,920 57 3,032 2
3 Japan 45,082 52 4,942 5
4 Russia 22,556 30 4,000 4
5 Germany 22,355 19
6 Korea 13,716 16
7 England 13,531 33
(Japan Atomic Industrial Forum)
ing to the July 29 Mainichi newspaper, “On July 28, JMA
decided to give cautionary information during a preliminary
stage before a warning statement, if highly probable precur-
sory phenomena are observed.” Another report in a magazine
(Shukan Asahi, Aug. 15, 2003) said that the “alert” proposed
by Mogi 17 years ago would be ﬁnally realized. It is also re-
ported that concrete measures are under consideration and
are to be implemented from the beginning of 2004.
3. Dangers of Nuclear Power Plants in the Focal
Region of the Tokai Earthquake
Next, I discuss another issue that could potentially bring
a critical and man-made disaster to all of Japan. It is the
issue of the Hamaoka nuclear power plants that are located
near the center of the focal region of the expected Tokai
earthquake.
3.1 Distributions of nuclear power plants and large
shallow earthquakes
Table 4 shows a list of the top seven nations as of January
2002, according to the amount of nuclear power generation
(Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, 2002). Almost all of these
nuclear power states are advanced nations, with the U.S.A.
at the top, followed by France, Japan, Russia, and Germany.
We can see from this table, not surprisingly, that the produc-
tion of the U.S.A., the superpower of the world, overwhelm-
ingly exceeds the others, but Japan, a nation of small islands
is third. Also Japan is on the top in regard to the number of
nuclear power plants under construction (as of 2002).
There have been vigorous arguments on the safety of nu-
clear power plants over time under various circumstances.
Almost nobody denies the potential catastrophic hazards of
nuclear power plants. In fact, this kind of concern unfortu-
nately became a reality with the 1979 Three Mile Island ac-
cident on the East Coast of the U.S.A., and the catastrophic
1986 Chernobyl accident in the former USSR. Through
these experiences, Germany, the top economic power in the
EU, decided to phase out nuclear power, and several other
European countries have reconsidered their nuclear power
policy much more cautiously.
It is important that we know where all the nuclear power
plants are located in the world today. Figure 9 shows the
distribution of nuclear power plants in the world, as of year
2000 (Data from the Federation of Electric Power Compa-
nies of Japan, 2000). We can see that the distribution is not
even, and most of the nuclear power plants are concentrated
in the U.S.A., the European region with France as its center,
and Japan. These three densely concentrated areas are the
top three nuclear power nations.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of large shallow earth-
quakes of magnitude (M) 7.0 or lager with focal depths less
than 40 km in the past 100 years (Data from Utsu, 2002).
One example of a large shallow M 7 class earthquake is
the Kobe Japan, earthquake (M 7.3, with maximum Seismic
Intensity of 7 on the JMA scale) that occurred directly un-
der the city of Kobe on January 17, 1995. This earthquake
caused the Great Hanshin Earthquake Disaster with a death
toll amounting to about 6400 and a huge number of collapsed
houses, bridges, and highways. An M 8 class earthquake
emits energy 30 times greater than that of an M 7 class earth-
quake. As mentioned before, the expected Tokai earthquake
may be a great earthquake of M 8.
We can see from the distribution of the earthquakes in the
world, shown in Fig. 10, that large shallow earthquakes do
not occur frequently everywhere, but only in limited regions.
One of these regions is the Circum-Paciﬁc Seismic Belt,
along the rim of the Paciﬁc ocean, and the other one is
the Himalaya-Alps Seismic Belt that connects Java-Sumatra-
Burma-Unnann-Himalaya-Turkey and Greece. One thing
to be noted is that there are no such large earthquakes on
the European continent and the American continent (except
along the Paciﬁc coast). These continents are quite stable.
Also, during modern times, there are no major earthquakes
in the Korean peninsula.
On the other hand, in Fig. 10, there are many earthquakes
in and around the Japanese Islands. The Japanese Islands
are completely contained within the Circum-Paciﬁc Seismic
Belt, the most active seismic zone in the world, and thus
Japan is essentially an unstable area.
Figure 11 shows both the distributions of nuclear power
plants and large shallow earthquakes in the same map. In this
ﬁgure, it can be clearly seen that for the three major nuclear
power plant areas, at sites in Europe and the U.S.A., large
shallow earthquakes have not occurred recently. In Japan,
however, the nuclear power plant sites and the active seis-
mic region are completely in the same areas. In short, unlike
in western countries, Japanese nuclear power plants are lo-
cated in the dynamically unstable areas, which is strongly
suggested by the high seismic activity.
As shown in Fig. 11, in the U.S.A., the largest nuclear
power in the world, most of the nuclear power pants are lo-
cated in the east, where the seismic hazards are relatively
low. There are a few nuclear plants in the western regions,
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Fig. 11. Distributions of nuclear power plants (black circle) and large shallow earthquakes in the past 100 years (red circle) are shown on the same map.
Fig. 12. Locations of nuclear power plants in Japan (Agency of National Resources and Energy, 2002) and Areas for Intensiﬁed Earthquake Prevention
Measures concerning the expected Tokai earthquake (Central Disaster Management Council, 2002).
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Fig. 13. Focal region of the expected Tokai earthquake and the Hamaoka nuclear power plants (Unit 1∼4).
where damaging earthquakes have occurred, for example the
1906 San Francisco earthquake (Mw 7.8) and the recent 1994
Northridge earthquake (Mw 6.7) near Los Angeles. The sit-
ting of all these nuclear power plants has undergone exten-
sive (and sometimes controversial) seismic hazard evalua-
tions.
France, the second largest nuclear power plant country,
has hardly had any signiﬁcant earthquakes and its land is
quite stable.
3.2 Problems of the locations of the Hamaoka nuclear
power plants
Generally speaking, in cases where nuclear power plants
are constructed, sitting needs to be carefully considered
so that dangers caused by earthquakes would be averted
as much as possible. However, as mentioned above, the
Japanese Islands are located in the very active seismic zone,
where the Paciﬁc plate is moving toward the northwest, col-
liding with the Asian continental plate and subducting below.
Figure 12 shows the location of Japanese nuclear power
plants prepared from materials published by the Agency
for National Resources and Energy (2002). As mentioned
above, all of the Japanese Islands are within the active seis-
mic region, but only the Tokai region is an area where an M
8 class earthquake is predicted to occur in the near future. As
mentioned in the previous section, the government acknowl-
edged the urgency for this area, and enacted the Large-Scale
Earthquake Countermeasures Law.
As mentioned before, the focal region is predicted and the
areas where the high seismic intensity is expected are spec-
iﬁed as “Areas for Intensiﬁed Earthquake Prevention Mea-
sures”. It is truly a grave problem that the Hamaoka nuclear
power plants have been built and put into operation very near
the center of the predicted focal region. Thus, the Hamaoka
nuclear power plants are located in the one area that should
have been avoided from the viewpoint of earthquake pre-
diction research in the Japanese Islands, as pointed out by
some researchers (e.g. Komura, 1981; Ishibashi, 1997; Mogi,
2001c). Figure 13 shows the enlarged map of the area, and
the curved line shows the predicted focal region, with the
Hamaoka nuclear power plants near the center.
It is quite important to know whether or not the possibility
of the “Tokai earthquake” had already been pointed out at the
time of construction of the Hamaoka nuclear power plants.
From this, we can see how much consideration was given
to nuclear safety by the Chubu Electric Company and the
government that gave the authorization.
As mentioned before, it was on October 28, 1969 that I
pointed out the possibility of an M 8 class earthquake in
the Tokai region at the monthly meeting of the Earthquake
Research Institute, University of Tokyo, which was open to
the public including the media.
The Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction
(CCEP) that had just been inaugurated in 1969 asked me to
attend the regular meeting of CCEP in November the same
year (I was not a member of the Committee at that time), and
I made the explanation regarding the possibility of the Tokai
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Table 5. Tokai Earthquake Problem and Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plants.
Tokai Earthquake Hamaoka Nuclear plants
Problem Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5
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earthquake. After the meeting, this result was announced
by Takahiro Hagiwara (Chairman of CCEP) at a press in-
terview. This announcement was immediately reported by
newspapers (Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei, and Chunichi), TV
(NHK, Fuji, Tokyo) and weekly magazines (Shukan Shin-
cho, Shukan Gendai). The graveness of the issue was ac-
knowledged and after the discussion in the subcommittee on
February 6 and at the 6th meeting of the CCEP on Febru-
ary 20 1970, it was deduced that the Tokai region would
be an Area of Speciﬁc Observation for an M 8 class earth-
quake. This result was extensively covered by the Report of
the CCEP (vol. 3) in July the same year.
Since the above-mentioned report in 1969, various inves-
tigations and observations on the Tokai earthquake started.
For example, Hagiwara himself started to investigate the
Seismic Intensity distribution of the 1854 Ansei-Tokai earth-
quake on the basis of historical documents, and this result
was published in the Report of the CCEP in 1970 (Hagi-
wara, 1970). According to his research, a large area from
the northwestern inland side of Suruga Bay to the coastal
region of Enshu-nada was hit by Seismic Intensity 7. GSI
(1970, 1974) examined the results of the leveling surveys,
and they reported not only the horizontal crustal movement
but also marked vertical movement (subsidence). These
crustal movements showed that the stress in the crust had ac-
cumulated appreciably. Based on the results from numerous
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investigations, in 1974, CCEP speciﬁed the Tokai area as an
Area of Intensiﬁed Observation, where observations should
be increased further due to the high possibility of an earth-
quake occurrence, and this prompted further precautions.
It was on May 22, 1970, seven months after the announce-
ment of the possibility of the “Tokai earthquake”, when
Chubu Electric Company applied for the construction of a
nuclear power plant at Hamaoka, in the center of the Tokai
region. After the examination by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC), this application was approved by the Prime
Minister on December 10, 1970. Hamaoka Unit 1 went
into commercial operation in March 1976. In September
1972, Chubu Electric Company submitted the application
for Hamaoka Unit 2 and it was approved in May 1973, and
its commercial operation started in November 1978 (see Ta-
ble 5).
While the possibility of the Tokai earthquake was being
pointed out, and surveys and observations were started, the
problem was also getting social attention. Hamaoka nuclear
power plants were proposed, and were licensed during only
a several month period of examination by the Atomic Energy
Commission. I cannot help being doubtful about how much
they were aware of the fact that the sitting of nuclear power
plant is fundamentally important to avoid nuclear disaster.
The information from seismology is always progressing, and
it would have been appropriate to stop and reconsider the
sitting, based on new research results about the Tokai region.
However, in fact, the series of movements by the CCEP
were totally overlooked, and Hamaoka Units 1 and 2 were
proposed and licensed in a very short time period, and the
construction went underway. It was regretful that I was not
even notiﬁed about the construction of such nuclear power
plants.
The left column of Table 5 shows the chronological
progress of the measures for disaster mitigation of the “Tokai
earthquake”. For comparison, the right columns show the
year and month of the application and operation of Hamaoka
Units 1 to 4, with addition of the construction of Unit 5.
When we take a look at this, while on one hand, a unique
law which is the ﬁrst of this kind in the world was estab-
lished saying, “Let’s predict the Tokai earthquake and miti-
gate the disaster by implementing various measures”, while
on the other hand, nuclear power plants were being built one
after another in Hamaoka, located near the center of the ex-
pected focal region. It is not meaningful to simply say that
no nuclear power plants should be built in any area that has
the potential for a large earthquake, especially since there is
a chance (although it may be small) of a large earthquake
in practically any land region. However, practical decisions
should be made with appropriate consideration of the risks
involved, especially for an area that has a very high chance
of a large earthquake during the lifetime of the nuclear facil-
ity.
3.3 Dangers of Hamaoka nuclear power plant
As mentioned in 3.1, in regard to the safety of nuclear
power plant, there have been vigorous arguments from the
early stages. In fact, larger scale accidents have happened in
the past, so there is almost nobody who would deny the large
potential risk of nuclear power plants (e.g. Nakajima, 1984).
However, discussions about nuclear power plant safety is-
sues in western countries are being done in places where
there are very few large earthquakes. Sitting of nuclear
power plants outside of Japan has usually been chsoen in
areas that have low probabilities of large earthquakes. For
safety considerations, regions of high seismic hazard have
been rejected as sites for nuclear power facilities.
In order to build a nuclear power plant, there are ex-
aminations at Nuclear Safety Commission. The Hamaoka
nuclear power plant was also examined, and based on the
Commission’s response, the Prime Minister authorized the
license. In any case, the recommendation of the Commis-
sion itself would have a big inﬂuence on this licensing pro-
cess. I pointed out the possibility of Tokai earthquake for
the ﬁrst time, and then worked for 10 years as the chairman
of the Committee of the “Area of Intensiﬁed Observation”
(Tokai and Tokyo Metropolitan areas) in CCEP. From 1978,
I was a member of the Earthquake Assessment Committee
(EAC) for the Tokai earthquake since it was inaugurated for
predicting the Tokai earthquake based on the Large-Scale
Earthquake Countermeasure Act, and eventually became the
chairman of EAC in 1991. Probably, I should have been one
of the most closely working members regarding the Tokai
earthquake issue. However, though I have been involved
with this issue for more than 30 years, I have never been
asked about the sitting and safety issue of the Hamaoka nu-
clear power plants by either the government or the Chubu
Electric Company, ofﬁcially or unofﬁcially. It is fair to state
that to my knowledge, the impact of the predicted “Tokai
earthquake” was not properly included in the sitting deci-
sions for the Hamaoka nuclear power plants.
A nuclear power plant is a complex facility. It contains
not only the reactor itself, but also has various buildings
with countless numbers of pipes and conduits. The safety
of such a compound facility is complex with many vulner-
able points, and thus unexpected damage may occur. Also,
there are many unknown aspects of the ground conditions
which supports a nuclear power plant, and the ground be-
haviors is complex when any stress is applied. Moreover, as-
suming that the magnitude and general location of an earth-
quake could be predicted, there still is very limited knowl-
edge regarding the shape of the fault plane and its rupture
process. Presently calculated scenarios contain only limited
simulations, and these can be quite different from reality. In
short, there are many uncertainties regarding the evaluations
of safety for nuclear power plant related to the occurrence of
an expected great earthquake.
Each time a large earthquake occurs, there have been new
types of damage beyond our expectations, and the earth-
quake resistance criteria, such as the Building Standard Law
of Japan, have been revised. When they saw highways falling
one after another at the time of the 1994 Northridge, Califor-
nia earthquake, Japanese earthquake engineers said publicly,
“These things will never happen in Japan”. However, just
one year later in 1995, they saw a highway collapse caused
by the Kobe earthquake, and “Japan’s safety myth” was de-
stroyed.
In 2003, the M 7 (not so large) Miyagiken-oki earthquake
occurred, in northeast Japan, with a relatively deep focal
depth (70 km) and caused considerable damage to bridge
columns of the Tohoku bullet train railway that had recently
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been built. There are always the possibilities of unexpected
accidents and destruction even though we carry out good
planning efforts. There is nobody who can say that nuclear
power plants will be safe when a great M 8 shallow earth-
quake occurs just below the sites.
If a highway bridge is destroyed by an earthquake, it
would be a problem, but still only a limited one. However,
if there were a large accident in Hamaoka, the impact would
not be limited to just the local area, but would affect a wide
area in Honshu, including Tokyo and Nagoya. This is such a
grave issue, and if such a thing happened, we cannot simply
say, “This was unexpected”. NHK news programs and some
newspapers covered the news of a recent pipe explosion ac-
cident at the Hamaoka nuclear power plant. Topics relevant
to the Tokai Earthquake problem such as revision of the In-
tensiﬁed Area, are also attracted media’s attention. However,
why is there hardly any news pointing out the importance of
this issue when simply considering the fact that the Hamaoka
nuclear power plants are located near the center of the focal
region of the expected great Tokai earthquake?
As I mentioned so far, the issue of the Hamaoka nuclear
power plants and the Tokai earthquake is a critical problem
which can bring a catastrophe to Japan through a man-made
disaster. At the same time, this is a problem we human
beings can prevent. Can nuclear power plants located just
above the focal region withstand a great shallow earthquake?
Japan, the sole country exposed to atomic bombs, should not
conduct such an experiment, which no other country would
dare.
4. Concluding Remark
Large earthquakes occur unexpectedly in most cases and
sometimes inﬂict enormous damage. Earthquake prediction,
which may contribute to mitigation of earthquake disasters,
is not only an extremely fascinating subject in seismology,
but also its ultimate goal. However, earthquake prediction
problems go beyond the bounds of merely being a special-
ist subject in one area of natural sciences. In this paper, two
serious issues are discussed concerning the expected Tokai
earthquake (M 8), central Honshu, (1) the danger of black-
and-white predictions and (2) the danger of nuclear power
plants constructed at Hamaoka, near the center of the ex-
pected focal region of the Tokai earthquake. These issues
may cause catastrophes for Japanese society. It is important
to explore these problems more thoroughly in order to pro-
ceed with the most suitable measures given current realities.
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